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INTRODUCTION
Many defined benefit(DB) pension funds base their strategic investment policy on Asset/Liability Management(ALM) studies. ALM uses techniques from the field of operations research to optimize funding and investment policies under uncertainty. See Ziemba and Mulvey (1998) for an extensive overview of the use of and research into ALM. An important feature of financial planning models such as used in ALM is the objective function. In the objective function, risk and return measures are specified to be able to make inferences on the desirability of policies under consideration. For a long time, the financial world has settled on the use of the mean and variance of investment returns to measure performance. Randall and Satchell (1997) is a good example of a traditional analysis. They compare the efficiency of different portfolios for pension fund assets with respect to the mean and variance of the return. This has the advantage of being able to use the standard toolkit of mean-variance analysis as developed by Markowitz (1952) in his CAPM.
The disadvantage, however, is that it does not take into account that pension funds experience a serious downside when returns are (too) low. This is even acknowledged by the authors, who note that pension funds cannot afford "to lose a huge amount of money, even if they are frequently making small amounts of money. This asymmetry is not accounted for by a model which is defined over mean and variance only."
Their analysis also prohibits an inference on how the investment decision depends on the (initial) financial position of the fund.
The developments of the last decade have led to using more explicit risk measures in ALM objectives. The risk measures that are used in most ALM studies are downside risk measures. The use of downside risk measures in a defined benefit context is widespread. See for example Sortino and Van der Meer (1991), Harlow (1991) , and Boender (1997) . A good illustration of the predominant technical approach to Asset/Liability Management in the literature is given by Zenios (1995) . He considers the computational problems of solving stochastic programming formulations for Asset/Liability Management in a fixed-income environment.
Clearly, the paper is not focused on the structure of the optimal decisions with respect to risk and return, but rather on the computational and model building aspects. The same holds for papers as Kusy and Ziemba (1986) , Hiller and Eckstein (1993) , Maranas et al. (1997) and Zenios et al. (1998) .
In this paper, we combine the traditional with the modern approach, by taking a downside risk measure from the field of ALM, and analyze the outcomes as a function of the initial conditions. As such, the novelty of our approach is not in the risk measure or subject of analysis, but rather in the comparative statics that have not been analyzed in this context before. Section 2 introduces the representative model for a defined benefit pension fund. Section 3 derives implications for pension fund investment policy in a relevant setting, and considers the sensitivity of the results to the specification of uncertainty. In Section 4 we explore empirical evidence of loss averse preferences for pension funds by examining actual pension fund investment policies.
Section 5 concludes.
MODEL
It is instructive to list the fundamental properties of DB pension funds, on which we base the formulation of the model that is introduced next. A DB fund can be characterized by three basic features:
(a) participants pay a fraction of their salary to obtain fixed pension rights, (b) the fund is supervised by an independent regulator, (c) there is a single investment and funding policy.
First, (a) implies that the liabilities have a relatively predictable level, influenced by demographics and career developments of participants. However, in most countries pension funds have an 'obligation of intent' for indexation. That is, if assets permit, nominal pension rights are corrected for price inflation (or even wage inflation). Note that participation is mandatory for workers in the same sector/company to join the pension fund. The compulsory participation for workers in a given sector implies that a regulator is necessary, hence feature (b). The regulator checks the financial status of the fund, quality of the management, and serves as protector of the rights of the active and inactive participants. The financial status of a fund can be summarized by the funding ratio, which is the ratio of assets over the present value of the liabilities. In the Netherlands, a 100% funding ratio is required by law. We will elaborate on this below. Feature (c) follows from the solidarity embedded in the fund's setup. All workers pay an equal fraction of their salary that is determined once a year. The solidarity across workers and across generations implies that the investment and funding decisions also have to be taken for the collective.
To formalize the investment problem, consider a pension fund at time 0 (now) with current wealth W 0 . At time T in the future, pension liabilities of W B need to be covered. The decision to be taken is the amount X 0 of wealth to invest in a risky asset yielding a gross return of u t at each period. The rest (W 0 − X 0 ) is invested in a risk-free asset with gross return r f in each period. Finally, the objective of the fund favors more wealth over less and punishes shortfall below the benchmark level W B . The formulation of the optimization problem is given by
where (y) + is the maximum of 0 and y and λ the aversion to shortfall. We find it convenient to define W B 0 as the risk-free discounted benchmark, given by W B /r T f . The symbols r f and u t represent the returns on the investment categories available to the fund. In practice, pension funds will invest in more than only two categories, but we can take the uncertain return u t to represent the return on a market portfolio of risky assets. W T is a natural representation for the total value of assets of the fund at time T. The choice for the static model excludes the possibility of policy changes between time 0 and T. Thus, the decision X * 0 gives an initial asset mix that is optimal over the whole planning period. Strategies in ALM studies are often also static rather than dynamic. The static model is straightforward to analyze, and the solution is representative for the solution to the multistage model, see Siegmann(2002, Chapter 2) .
We will refer to the model in (1) and (2) as the mean-shortfall model. However, it also represents loss aversion. Loss aversion to model preferences for risky outcomes was introduced by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) . The work of Kahneman and Tversky has been the starting point for the area of behavioral finance, for a good overview see Hirshleifer (2001) or Shleifer (2000) . The relevance for the present paper is that the model is rooted in behavioral evidence on decision making under uncertainty. This can be added to the motivation based on the institutional setting of defined benefit pension funds. In the following, we will use both the terms shortfall aversion and loss aversion to represent the second term in equation (1).
A limitation of the objective function in (1) is that it is one-dimensional, i.e., it is defined in terms of the single variable W 1 . The real objective for a defined benefit fund, however, consists of several competing objectives. Typical objectives are: minimal contributions, maximal indexation of pensions, and minimal risk with respect to funding. With respect to the latter, the key ratio that is reported as a measure of financial soundness of a fund is the actuarial funding ratio. It is simply the value of assets divided by the present value of the liabilities, W 0 /W B 0 . Another measure is the surplus, which can be defined as W 0 −W B 0 . Now, if the funding ratio (or surplus) is high, the risk of underfunding is low, the contribution level can be lowered, and indexation can fully compensate for inflation. Hence, in the simple model of pension fund investment, we use an ALM objective that is only defined in terms of the surplus of the fund, which has a 1-1 relation with the funding ratio. If the surplus is high, the other objectives are met at the same time. If the surplus is low, or if there is a deficit, the associated consequences are carried over to the other objectives, e.g., for a fund with a low funding level, contributions are raised and indexation might be postponed. See Boender and Vos (2000) for an analysis of the mechanism of allocating financial risks over multiple objectives for a pension fund, which they call risk-budgeting.
Our approach compares to that of Leibowitz et al. (1992) , who model shortfall-aversion of pension funds by incorporating a shortfall constraint on the 'surplus return'. The usefulness of their approach is that they explicitly reckon with the duration of pension liabilities versus the duration of available fixed-income instruments. However, the problem with their setup is that a solution does not always exist, and if it exists it will be a corner solution. Here, we explicitly use a fixed penalty on shortfall in the objective function.
More on this further below.
Pension liabilities
Interpreting W B is key to the present paper. It is the reference level relative to which either a gain or a loss is measured. For a defined benefit pension fund, a natural candidate for the reference level is the value of the liabilities that needs to be covered at time T. The liabilities of a pension fund consist of the pension rights built-up by the contributors. The value of these rights can be computed by discounting the future pension payments, in the Dutch system an actuarial discount rate of 4%. W B can be interpreted as the discounted value at time T of the guaranteed (future) pension payments.
At this point, we need to discuss the role of inflation and indexation in the objective of the fund. If pension funds would only be concerned with protecting the nominal value of pensions, it is difficult to see why they would not invest in the most safe assets only. As all pension funds nowadays invest a considerable portion of their assets in equities, it must be the case that funds are aiming to protect the real value of pension rights. As such, inflation becomes the the key variable of interest for a pension fund, as it influences the real value of pensions. There are several factors that influence the liabilities of a defined benefit pension fund, W B in our model, such as the career developments of individual (active) members, and wage inflation.
For simplicity we only focus on the most important factor, price inflation. The decrease in real value of nominal pension rights is compensated for by applying indexation. That brings about a direct link between price inflation and the nominal level of the liabilities, W B .
In the model, we can model the effect of price inflation on W B by introducing a variable π, representing inflation over the planning period. Defining the real pension obligations at the end date as W B real , the nominal reference point W B is determined as
where 1 + π is the gross inflation factor, assuming annual compounding. The setup in (3) makes it easy to study the effect of inflation on the optimal solution. It can also make clear the way that current regulation sees the valuation of liabilities. Under the current Dutch regulation, nominal liabilities are discounted at a rate of 4%. It is difficult to find a formal rationale for this method, but the opinion seems to be that 4% is a reasonable proxy for the long-term real rate of interest. Using equation (3) and the definition of W B 0 , we can see that if the level of liabilities is multiplied by inflation, i.e., full indexation, the actuarial interest rate of 4% corresponds to a nominal risk-free return of (1 + π) · 1.04.
Planning horizon
We choose the length of the planning period equal to T = 15 years, intended to match the duration of the liabilities of an average pension fund. In an attempt to explain the equity premium puzzle, Benartzi and Thaler (1995) postulate that investors and pension funds are loss averse and myopic, i.e., T = 1 year. They motivate the suggestion of myopia by pointing out that investors account for their gains and losses at the end of each year. The only evidence they give, however, is that the average asset mix from their model is comparable to the average mix found in their dataset of institutional investors. Besides the debatable evidence, at the outset myopia is unrealistic for pension funds. Pension fund managers frequently express their view that they are, and should be, long-term investors, and should not be pinned down on 1-year performance figures. This view is consistent with the practice of motivating investment policies by ALM studies that calculate risk and return over a long-term horizon.
Shortfall risk
The objective function in (1) involves the maximization of wealth (or surplus), with a penalty on the expected amount of deficit below 100% actuarial funding. Loss aversion with respect to deficits below W B represents that, in a defined benefit system, the liabilities need to be covered by available assets. The formulation in (1) allows for a deficit. The parameter λ represents the aversion to shortfall. In the context of pension funds, the extent of shortfall aversion is influenced by the fund's flexibility in a situation of underfunding. A fund with much flexibility with regard to jumps in the contribution rate, additional capital injections by the sponsor, lowering of pension rights, and skipping of indexation, might be less shortfallaverse than a fund that does not have such flexibility.
A problem with incorporating shortfall aversion in the objective function for a pension fund, is that there is an obligation by law that the current value of all pension liabilities should always be covered by available assets. The Dutch law on pensions, the PSF (Pensioen-en Spaarfondsenwet), stipulates in article 9a sub 1 that "the assets of a pension fund should ... be sufficient to cover the pension liabilities." This constitutes the most serious financial check that is to be performed by the regulator, the PVK (pensions and insurance supervisory authority of the Netherlands). As such, interpreting W B as the level of pension liabilities, the situation W T < W B is against the law. However, the possibility of underfunding is real, and an analysis would not be realistic if it is without a characterization of optimal behavior for a fund in such a situation.
Note that the idea of specifying a trade-off corresponds to actual behavior of individuals towards risk: a higher benefit or reward will lead people to accept more risk. Put otherwise, people optimize, rather than minimize. In the same way, pension fund management will balance the risk of stock investment with the higher expected returns it generates.
An additional obligation for most pension funds is the statutory commitment to safeguard the real value of pensions, by means of providing indexation on accrued pension rights. Such indexation can usually be postponed if the financial position of the fund does not allow it, but if the position gets better in the future the fund first needs to apply the postponed indexation. Indexation will be modeled as an extension in which W B becomes stochastic and determined by inflation.
RESULTS
This section presents the optimal investment policies for the DB pension fund that was presented in Section 2. Subsection 3.1 deals with the basic model in which inflation π, and thus W B , is assumed constant.
We take r f such that the actuarial discount rate of 4% is correct. Subsection 3.2 specifies a joint probability distribution of inflation and the stock return, while Subsection 3.3 considers the consequences of having a risk-free rate that is not in accordance with the actuarial assumption of a real rate of 4%. Subsection 3.4 presents the results for an alternative specification of downside risk, one which is often used in ALM studies.
Base case
In the most simple case, we assume that W B real , the real level of liabilities at time T, is known with certainty at time 0, so inflation π is a known constant. As the planning horizon is 15 years, a reasonable assumption for the expectation of inflation is 2% per year, the inflation ceiling for the medium term of the European Central Bank (ECB). That makes W B = (1.02) T · W B real . Assuming that the current practice of using an actuarial discount rate of 4% for nominal liabilities represents a real discount rate, we set the riskfree return to an annual 6.1%, i.e., r f = (1.061) T . This has the effect that a real liability of 180 at time T has a present value of 180 · (1.02/1.061) T = 180/1.04 T = 100. The only uncertainty in the model now comes from the yearly return on the risky asset u t . We take u t to have a lognormal probability distribution with an average return of 10% and standard deviation of 17%, representing typical historical figures for stock returns.
To solve model (1), we discretize the distribution of the 15-year return Π 15 t=1 u t using 500 points, and find the optimal stock investment through numerical optimization. Doing this for different values of the initial wealth W 0 results in pairs (W 0 , X * 0 ). Figure 1 shows the resulting optimal fractions X * 0 /W 0 as a function of the funding ratio W 0 /W B 0 for different values of the loss aversion parameter λ. Recall that W B 0 is defined as W B /r T f , so that a real liability of 180 and initial wealth of 100 gives a funding ratio of 1. Table 1 lists the values of λ and the associated probabilities of shortfall or surplus. Table 1 The values of λ used to compute the optimal investment decisions in Figure 1 The second column lists the probability of underfunding, given a positive initial surplus. The third column gives the probability that the final surplus is positive, given a negative initial surplus. From Figure 1 we can observe the typical V-shape that is known to appear as a result of a mean-shortfall optimization. See the appendix for a derivation of the result for a one-period model. Note that the lefthand side does not correspond with a gambling-strategy. Models that result in such a strategy assume that an agent has nothing more to loose below a certain point, and thus gambles everything. In our model, however, an explicit penalty is given to shortfall, explicitly modeling that there is something to loose. More on this below.
The figure has a number of interesting consequences. First consider the shape of the optimal funding policy.
For a funding ratio of 100%, the real pension liability is fully covered. In this case, the optimal allocation does not contain stocks and thus represents a minimum-risk portfolio. At a funding ratio of more than 100%, the surplus asset value leads to an increasingly higher fraction in stocks, using the risk premium on stock investment to make the fund even wealthier (in expectation). At funding ratios below 100%, stock investments increase in the extent of underfunding. When the pension liabilities cannot be guaranteed with certainty anymore, the fund has to take risk to prevent a further erosion of the pension claims. A higher percentage in stocks is the only way to reach the benchmark W B with positive probability. In a real-world setting, an alternative to increasing X 0 can be an increased contribution from the side of the sponsor, or a more frugal pension claim by lowering indexation. Both alternatives can be visualized as having the effect of shifting the financial position of the fund to the right on the horizontal axis of Figure 1 , either by increasing the numerator or by decreasing the denominator of the funding ratio.
Second, observe that the loss aversion parameter λ has a decreasing effect on the steepness of the V-shape in Figure 1 . This corresponds to intuition: A higher loss aversion leads to a safer asset mix, as the certainty of the risk-free return becomes more attractive than the possible extra return on stocks. For the rest of this paper, we take λ = 110, representing a 1% probability of underfunding.
Finally, pension funds usually use an ALM study to support an investment policy that is aimed at holding a "strategic mix". The figure shows, however, that the optimal initial asset mix for the 15 year period depends on the initial funding ratio. This suggests that holding the same mix whatever the funding ratio is not a good idea from an optimization point of view. The empirical results in Section 4 shows that the fraction invested in stocks is not constant for the funds examined.
So far, we have assumed a deterministic value for W B . In the next subsection we consider the robustness of the shape of the decision rules to the introduction of an uncertain inflation rate that influences the level W B .
Inflation uncertainty
With an uncertain inflation rate π, and the reference point W B in the objective function (1) becomes a stochastic variable. Log-stock returns and inflation are modeled as bivariate normal. This way, the covariance matrix Σ of the logs looks as
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between inflation π and the log-stock return u. For the stock return we take a mean of 10% and standard deviation of 17%. These correspond to a normal distribution with µ = 0.085 and σ = 0.16 for the log-stock return. Mean inflation is again equal to 2% and r f = 1.061. As the mean and variance of inflation are based on historical data, the analysis will also consider alternative values. With sufficient controversy over the size of the correlation between inflation and stock returns, the parameter ρ is varied in the analysis, starting from a value of zero. Results for varying values of the standard deviation σ π of inflation are in Figure 2 .
From Figure 2 we observe the same basic pattern as in Figure 1 , i.e., the percentage in stocks has a Vshaped relation with the funding ratio. The difference with Figure 2 is that the kink of the V does not lie at a zero stock-investment. The minimum-risk portfolio contains stocks. When inflation can only be hedged partially, the bottom line is that there is always uncertainty with respect to the level of the final pension payment.
Next, we consider the optimal solution to the loss averse model when the correlation between stocks and inflation is non-zero. In the long run stocks are considered a partial hedge for inflation risk. This is one of the motivations for investing in stocks in case of indexed pension claims, see Leibowitz et al. (1994) . Randall and Satchell (1997) find a positive correlation for UK data of 0.16 between equity and paid-out pensions. However, for Dutch data from 1956 to 1994, Dert (1995) finds an annual negative correlation coefficient of -0.24 between log-stock returns and price inflation. Figure 3 shows the effect of changes in the correlation ρ between stock returns and inflation. For a given funding ratio, a higher correlation results in a larger stock investment. The effect on the investment policy is only moderate, however. With a yearly correlation of 90%, which is very high, the maximum difference in fraction stocks compared to no correlation is 15 percentage points. It is surprising that this effect is so limited. As mentioned before: the presence of correlation between stock returns and inflation motivates stock investment as an inflation hedge. Given that the true correlation is suggested to lie between 0.1 and 0.5, this motivation seems to be of limited importance in practice. The positive risk-premium of stocks is more important than the effect of a positive correlation with inflation.
Alternative interest rates
Until now, all calculations assumed that the actuarial interest rate of 4% is a reasonable representation of the long-term average of the real interest rate. In this paragraph we extend the analysis to include the fact that the real interest rate can differ from 4 percent. For example, Chaveau and Loufir (1997) expect a low future interest rate due to the ageing of the population. In any case, the value of the real interest rate directly affects the market value of the indexed liabilities. Valuation of the liabilities according to market value is finding more ground in the Dutch pension fund sector. Using a real interest rate lower than 4% gives a lower funding ratio, using a higher interest rate gives a higher funding ratio. To illustrate the consequences of a real interest rate other than 4%, Figure 4 shows the solutions to model (1) for varying values of the risk-free interest rate r f . From the figure we can observe that the location of the minimum-risk portfolio,
i.e., the bottom of the V-shape, is very sensitive to the value of the risk-free rate. Without uncertainty in W B , the minimum-risk portfolio lies at zero surplus, see also Figure 1 of this section. The wealth level that gives zero surplus equals the discounted value of the liabilities W B against the risk-free rate r f . A larger r f decreases the discounted value, a smaller r f increases it. Hence, as the funding ratio on the x-axis of Figure 4 is computed regardless of the true value of r f , the shift of the V-shape is due to the shift in the risk-free discounted value of the liabilities.
Downside deviation
The mean-shortfall model was selected because of its simplicity, having an analytical characterization of the optimal solution, see Siegmann(2002, Chapter 2) . In practice, however, ALM for pension funds predominantly uses downside deviation as the risk measure. Therefore, we now explore the sensitivity of the outcomes to taking downside deviation. The analytical outcome for the case of a fixed benchmark has been studied in Siegmann(2002, Chapter 3) .
Using downside deviation as a risk measure boils down to taking quadratic shortfall. The popularity of its use is due to the fact that the marginal penalty on losses increases with the magnitude of the loss. The (1) are shown when the risk-free rate r f is varied. With expected inflation of 2%, the rate of 6.1% corresponds to a real rate of 4%.
formulation of the objective becomes,
with the parameters defined as before, and T = 15. The difference with the objective function (1) is the power of 2 in the second term of (5). The loss aversion parameter is now represented by ν, signaling that the risk measure is different. The top-right, and lower-left panel show the effect of uncertainty in inflation on the outcomes. We find that σ π and ρ have the same effect on the decision rule as in the mean-shortfall model. Increasing inflation uncertainty makes the minimum-risk point of the V-shape shift to the right. Increasing correlation between inflation and stock returns, the minimum stock allocation increases, as does the fraction of stocks for positive surpluses. As in Figure 3 , the left-hand side of the V is not affected significantly by a positive correlation.
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE
The previous sections have shown the specific investment policies that are optimal in the mean-shortfall framework representing a DB pension fund. To test if the framework is indeed representative for a DB fund, the strategies that are followed in reality should be comparable with our results. This section provides a first reality-check of the results, by analyzing historical investment policies followed by six of the largest Dutch pension funds. Table 2 shows the asset values and funding ratios of the six pension funds. ABP is the pension fund for all Dutch government personnel, and the largest in terms of asset value in the Netherlands (and second in the world). The Shell pension fund is for employees of Royal Dutch Shell. PGGM is the fund for workers in the health sector. Philips is obviously for Philips workers. BPMT is the fund for people working in the steel and technical industries. Finally, SPF is the fund that covers the pension for workers at one of the companies associated with the Dutch railways. In total, these funds represent 58% of the total of pension assets in the Netherlands of 435 billion in 2001. Ultimo 2001, all six funds in Table 2 are overfunded, i.e., they have a funding ratio larger than 100%. We saw in Subsection 3.3 that the kink of the V-shape does not necessarily have to lie at 100% actuarial funding. While there are worries about the diminishing buffers of pension funds against the 4% actuarial discount rate, the problems could be even more pronounced if the market value of liabilities is taken to calculate the funding ratio.
Having seen current funding ratios, we are interested in actual investment policies over the past 5 years. Figure 6 presents the scatter plots of the funding ratio versus fractional stock investment for the six pension funds listed in Table 2 . Note that the funding ratios reported are the ratio of assets over the discounted value of nominal liabilities. Of course, a reported funding ratio of, for example, 110% is not enough to protect the real value of the pension rights in a risk free manner. For interpretation purposes, Table 3 lists annual returns for representative stock and bond indices.
As can be seen in Table 3 [1997] [1998] . Note that stock investments do not have to be the only risky investments that pension funds have. Several funds invest a significant part of their assets, i.e., more than 5%, in risky investments such as private equity or real-estate.
However, the fractions invested in those categories were either too small or relatively stable over time, so they are not considered in the analysis.
Ultimo 2001, the funds differ considerably in the fraction of stocks they have. ABP and BPMT have around 40% stocks, with funding ratios of 1.1 and 1.2, respectively. Philips and SPF have 55%, with funding ratios of 1.3 and 1.45. PGGM and Shell have a high 70% stock investment, and funding ratios of 1.1 and 1.4. If we look at the three pairs of funds with comparable stock investments, PGGM stands out, having one of the lowest funding ratios, with the highest stock investment. It also has the most stable fraction of stocks over time, so it might be the result of taking a long-term calculated risk, rather than a double-or-nothing policy.
Turning to the investment patterns present in Figure 6 , we see a diffuse behavior for the first period 1997-1998. Stock returns were very high in this year, but pension funds do not show a shared opinion on whether to increase or decrease the fraction of stocks. In the top panels, ABP and Shell had an increasing funding ratio, and decreasing stock fraction. The middle two panels show funding ratios and stock fractions with only little variation. The lower two panels show an increasing stock fraction with either a stable or increasing funding ratio. Clearly, investment policies differed to a large extent during the year 1997.
From 1998 onward, however, identical patterns emerge. At the end of 1999 the fraction of stocks has increased with the funding ratio, and has decreased again at the end of 2000. From 2000 to 2001, the funding ratios decrease further, but now the stock investments increase. The extent of the stock increase in the last year is only small for ABP, PGGM, and SPF, but given the large decreases in funding ratios (see the large negative returns on stocks), it represents a significant investment decision for all funds. The pattern can partly be explained by funds following a fixed-mix strategy. For four of the six panels, namely ABP, PGGM, Philips and SPF, one could imagine that the observed stock investments are the result of a fixed-mix strategy, where rebalancing occurs at the beginning of each year. For SPF, ABP, and Philips, though, we need to add the assumption that the strategic asset mix has changed after 1997 or 1998. For two of the six funds, namely Shell and BPMT, it is difficult to see how a fixed-mix policy would lead to the observed patterns. Over the period 1998-2001, both funds show a series of consecutive increasing and decreasing stock fractions of more than 7%-points.
If one wants to find V-shapes in the graphs, it depends on the observer whether it can be seen or not. A formal test of loss-averse behavior needs more data. Also, in assessing the figures, one needs to take into account the fact that funds differ not only in their funding ratio, but also in the composition of the members, financial position of the sponsor, and expectation of the economic fundamentals. This also motivates the choice for different axes for each fund.
V-shapes or not, I think the usefulness of the mean-shortfall results can be clearly seen in the situation of ABP and PGGM, which are well known for their sheer size. Newspaper interviews with the management of these funds indicates that they might be seen as typical 'left-siders' in the terms of the found V-shape in this paper. It is said that they need the high stock investment to counter an expected high liability growth.
Thus, although the funds formally have a surplus of around 10% ultimo 2001, their financial position in real terms (i.e., taking into account indexation) is one of shortfall, where risky investments are needed. This is best understood in the mean-shortfall analysis of this paper.
Clearly, the preliminary analysis of Figure 6 can at best be only suggestive about the validity of the meanshortfall model for defined benefit pension funds. The main puzzle boils down to explaining the nondecrease in the fraction of stocks in the portfolio from 2000 to 2001, despite two consecutive large negative stock returns. So far, it appears that the mean-shortfall framework is helpful in explaining part of this puzzle.
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CONCLUSION
In this paper I have introduced a simple mean-shortfall model for the investment decision of a defined benefit(DB) pension fund. Shortfall was measured relative to the real (indexed) value of the liabilities. A V-shaped policy was found to be the optimal investment strategy as a function of the initial funding ratio.
This implies increased risk-taking for increasing initial shortfall. The sensitivity of the optimal investment strategy has been explored for changes in the economic assumptions on inflation, the correlation between stock returns and inflation, and the level of the real interest rate. Results for a different risk measure, namely downside-deviation were also obtained, closely resembling those of the mean-shortfall model. The results have in common that the optimal investment policies all have a typical V-or U-shaped relation with the initial wealth of the fund. A lower risk free interest rate and higher inflation uncertainty both move the optimal policy to the right, i.e., the minimum-risk allocation is attained at higher wealth levels.
Section 4 considered patters of portfolio adjustment versus funding ratios for six large Dutch pension funds.
Further research using a larger and richer dataset is necessary to come up with better representations of the investment strategies pension funds are following.
